


WIN-WIN-WIN APPROACHES TO MATERNITY CARE How Payment Reform Can Enable Better Care for Mothers & Babies and Lower Medicaid Spending

Harold D. Miller
President and CEO
Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform

www.CHQPR.org




The Problem of High and Growing Healthcare Spending






The Opportunity: Spending That is Unnecessary or Avoidable






The Goal: Less Avoidable \$, More Desirable \$, Less Total \$






Significant Opportunities to Reduce Maternity Care Spending

\$






A Major Barrier: The Current Payment System






Barrier #1: No \$ or Inadequate \$ for High-Value Services






Barrier #2: Avoidable Spending is Revenue for the Providers...






...And When Avoidable Services Aren't Delivered...






...Providers' Fixed Costs Don't Disappear...






...Leaving Providers With Losses (or Bigger Losses Than Today)






A Payment Change isn't Reform Unless It Removes the Barriers




No Payment or Inadequate Payment for:

- Services delivered outside of face-to-face visits with clinicians, e.g., phone calls, e-mails, etc.
- Services delivered by non-clinicians, e.g., nurses, community health workers, etc.
- Non-medical services, e.g., transportation
- Services "covered" by a bundled or global payment for patients with higher intensity needs





Today's Focus: Paying for High-Value Services






Most Current "Payment Reform" Proposals Are Problematic

- Provider approach
- Payer approach




Provider Approach: "Trust Us" ("Studies Say It Will Save Money")





Provider Approach: "Trust Us" ("Studies Say It Will Save Money")



PROVIDER SOLUTION:




DESIRABLE SPENDING


No matter how many studies have been done saying that a service saved money in demonstration projects, that's no guarantee that savings will be achieved when the service is implemented by all providers for all patients



Payer Concern: No *Accountability* to Reduce Avoidable Spending




Payer Concern #2: New Services Will Be Used More Than Necessary






Payer Response: Pay for Less Than What's Needed






Result: Inadequate Services = Little or No Impact on Spending






Limitations of FFS Codes: Not All Patients Are Alike






So It Doesn't Make Sense to Deliver the Same Services to Each






Failure to Target Spending Can Fail to Achieve Adequate Savings






Result: Higher Spending Overall






A Better Approach: Flexibility to Target Services Based on Need





A Better Result: More Savings From Focusing on Higher Needs






Most Current "Payment Reform" Proposals Are Problematic

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


Payer Approach: Save Us Money and...






Payer Approach: Save Us Money and We'll You Pay More Next Year





Provider Concern: Shared Savings is Too Little, Too Late





UNPAID


Payer Approach #2: Global Budget for Services

PAYER SOLUTION #2: SĀVĪNGS **AVOIDABLE SPENDING GLOBAL BUDGET FOR SERVICES** DESIRABLE SPENDING




Provider Has Flexibility to Provide Different Services Within Budget

PAYER SOLUTION #2:





Patient Concern: Will Global Budget Result in Stinting on Care?





The Four Key Elements of Accountable Payment Models



The Four Key Elements of Successful Payment Reforms

1. Flexibility in Care Delivery. The payment system should give providers freedom to deliver care in ways that will achieve high quality in the most efficient way and to adjust care delivery to the unique needs of individual patients.



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


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- 3. Appropriate Accountability for Quality. The payment system should assure patients and payers that the quality of care will remain the same or improve. The payment system should hold providers accountable for quality they can control, but not for aspects of quality or outcomes they cannot control or influence.
- **4. Adequacy of Payment**. The size of the payments should be adequate to cover the providers' costs of delivering high quality care for the types of patients they see and at the levels of cost or efficiency that are feasible for them to achieve.




A Final Problem: Some Programs Take Time To Generate Savings






A Solution: Combining Short-Term and Long-Term Savings Initiatives





A Solution: Combining Short-Term and Long-Term Savings Initiatives





Example: Reducing Repeat Unplanned Pregnancies

		CI	JRRE	NT
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$
P	hysician Svcs			
	1st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	30	\$45,000
	Subtotal			\$195,000
Н	ospital Pmt			
	1st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000
To	otal Spending		100	\$650,000

100 Pregnant Women on Medicaid

- Physician delivers babies in the hospital
- Postpartum care included in physician's global fee; no separate or additional payment made
- 30% of women have a subsequent unplanned pregnancy



Pay More for Postpartum Care After Initial Pregnancy?

		CI	JRREI	NT		FUTUR	RE	
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	Chg
P	hysician Svcs							
	1 st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000	\$1,500	100	\$150,000	
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0	\$350	100	\$35,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	30	\$45,000				
	Subtotal			\$195,000				
Н	ospital Pmt							
	1 st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000				
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000				
T	otal Spending		100	\$650,000				



More Payment Increases Costs If No Impact on 2nd Pregnancies

		Cl	JRRE	NT		FUTUF	RE		
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	C	hg
Р	hysician Svcs								
	1st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000	\$1,500	100	\$150,000		
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0	\$350	100	\$35,000	5	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	30	\$45,000	\$1,500	30	\$45,000	>	-0%
	Subtotal			\$195,000			\$230,000	+	-18%
Н	ospital Pmt								
	1 st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000	\$3,500	100	\$350,000		
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000	\$3,500	30	\$105,000		-0%
T	otal Spending		100	\$650,000		100	\$685,000		+5%



But Success in Reducing 2nd Pregnancies Reduces Total Costs

		Cl	JRRE	NT		FUTUR	RE	
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	Chg
P	hysician Svcs							
	1st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000	\$1,500	100	\$150,000	
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0	\$350	100	\$35,000	>
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	30	\$45,000	\$1,500	15	\$22,500	-50%
	Subtotal			\$195,000			\$207,500	+6%
Н	ospital Pmt							
	1st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000	\$3,500	100	\$350,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000	\$3,500	15	\$52,500	-50%
T	otal Spending		100	\$650,000		100	\$610,000	-6%



Affordable Upfront Payment Depends on Minimum Results

		CI	JRRE	NT		FUTUF	RE	
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	Chg
P	hysician Svcs							
	1 st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000	\$1,500	100	\$150,000	
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0	\$350	100	\$35,000	>
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	30	\$45,000	\$1,500	23	\$34,500	-23%
	Subtotal			\$195,000			\$219,500	+13%
Н	lospital Pmt							
	1 st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000	\$3,500	100	\$350,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000	\$3,500	23	\$80,500	-23%
T	otal Spending		100	\$650,000		100	\$650,000	-0%



Affordable Upfront Payment Depends on Minimum Results

			CI	URRE	NT			FUTUF	RE		
		\$/\$	ervice	#/Yr	Total \$		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$		Chg
Physician S	vcs										
1st Pregna	ıncy									0	
Postpartui	Υ		VA/I-	-1 -		41.		- n. 4l-	-4 4l	0	
2 nd Pregna	ancy				ssures		•			0	-23%
Subtotal			•		er will					0	+13%
Hospital Pn	nt		in re	educ	cing rep) (eat pre	gnar	ncies?		
1 st Pregna	ıncy									0	
2 nd Pregna	ancy									0	-23%
Total Spend	ling			100	\$650,000			100	\$650,00	00	-0%



Solution: Lower Upfront Payment With Bonus for Success

		CI	JRRE	NT			FUTUF	RE		
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$		Chg
P	hysician Svcs									
	1 st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000		\$1,500	100	\$150,000		
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0	(\$250	100	\$25,000	$ arraycolor{1}{7}$	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	30	\$45,000		\$1,500	20	\$30,000		0%
$ \leftarrow $	Bonus					\$1,000	10	\$10,000		
	Subtotal			\$195,000				\$215, 000	1	+10%
Н	lospital Pmt									
	1 st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000		\$3,500	100	\$350,000		
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000		\$3,500	20	\$70,000		0%
T	otal Spending		100	\$650,000			100	\$635,000		-2%



Better Results = Higher Payment

		CI	JRRE	NT			FUTUF	RE		
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$		Chg
P	hysician Svcs									
	1 st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000		\$1,500	100	\$150,000		
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0	(\$250	100	\$25,000	$ arraycolor{1}{5}$	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	30	\$45,000		\$1,500	15	\$22,500		-50%
	Bonus					\$1,000	15	\$15,000		
	Subtotal			\$195,000				\$212, 500	1	+9%
Н	lospital Pmt									
	1 st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000		\$3,500	100	\$350,800		
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000		\$3,500	15	\$52,500		-50%
T	otal Spending		100	\$650,000			100	\$615,000		-5%



Better Results = Higher Payment

	CI	JRRE	NT			FUTUR	RE	
	\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	Chg
Physician Svcs								
1st Pregnancy							O	
Postpartum	\A/I-	-1 -		41.		-		\triangleright
2 nd Pregnancy			ssures 1		-		<u> </u>	-50%
Bonus	pro	Vid	er will e	V	en try	to re	educe o	
Subtotal		re	epeat pi	re	gnanc	ies?	0	+9%
Hospital Pmt								
1st Pregnancy							O	
2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000		\$3,500	15	\$52,500	-50%
Total Spending		100	\$650,000			100	\$615,000	-5%

"Accountability" Means Penalty for Failure, Not Just Bonus for Success

		CI	JRRE	NT			FUTUR	E	
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	Chg
P	hysician Svcs								
	1 st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000		\$1,500	100	\$150,000	
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0	(\$250	100	\$25,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	30	\$45,000		\$1,500	30	\$45,000	-0%
arrange	Bonus < 23%					\$2,000	0	\$0	
	Penalty > 23%					(\$3,500)	7	(\$24,500)	
	Subtotal			\$195,000				\$195,500	0%
Н	ospital Pmt								
	1 st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000		\$3,500	100	\$350,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000		\$3,500	30	\$105,000	-0%
T	otal Spending		100	\$650,000			100	\$650,000	0%



Hitting the Target Rate (23%) Allows Provider & Payer to Win

		CI	URREI	NT		FUTUF	₹E	
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	Chg
P	hysician Svcs							
	1 st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000	\$1,500	100	\$150,000	
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0	\$250	100	\$25,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	30	\$45,000	\$1,500	23	\$35,500	-23%
	Bonus < 23%				\$2,000	0	\$8,000	
	Penalty > 23%				(\$3,500)	0	\$0	
	Subtotal			\$195,000			\$209,500	+7%
Н	lospital Pmt							
	1 st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000	\$3,500	100	\$350,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000	\$3,500	23	\$80,500	-23%
T	otal Spending		100	\$650,000		100	\$640,000	-2%

Beating the Target Rate Allows Both Provider & Payer to Win More

		Cl	JRREI	NT		FUTUF	RE	
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	Chg
Р	hysician Svcs							
	1st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000	\$1,500	100	\$150,000	
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0	\$250	100	\$25,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	30	\$45,000	\$1,500	15	\$22,500	-0%
	Bonus < 23%				\$2,000	8	\$16,000	
	Penalty > 23%				(\$3,500)	0	\$0	
	Subtotal			\$195,000			\$213,500	+9%
Н	ospital Pmt							
	1st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000	\$3,500	100	\$350,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000	\$3,500	15	\$52,500	-50%
T	otal Spending		100	\$650,000		100	\$616,000	-5%



Targeting Higher-Risk Population Allows More Upfront Investment

	CI	CURRENT			FUTUR	RE	
	\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	
Physician Svcs							
1st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000				
Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0				
2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	70	\$105,000				
Subtotal			\$255,000				
Hospital Pmt							
1st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000				
2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	70	\$245,000				
Total Spending		100	\$850,000				



Greater Upfront Investment Plus Expectation of Bigger Impact

		Cl	JRREI	NT		FUTUR	RE	
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	Chg
P	hysician Svcs							
	1st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000	\$1,500	100	\$150,000	
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0	\$1,000	100	\$100,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	70	\$105,000				
	Bonus < 40%				\$2,000	0	\$0	
	Penalty > 40%				(\$3,300)	0	\$0	
	Subtotal			\$255,000				
Н	ospital Pmt							
	1 st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000				
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	70	\$245,000				
T	otal Spending		100	\$850,000				

Win-Win-Win for Patient, Provider & Payer If Target is Met/Exceeded

		Cl	JRREI	NT			FUTUR	RE	
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	Chg
Р	hysician Svcs								
	1st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000		\$1,500	100	\$150,000	
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0		\$1,000	100	\$100,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	70	\$105,000		\$1,500	40	\$60,006	-43%
	Bonus < 40%					\$2,000	. 0	\$0	
	Penalty > 40%				٥	atient W	ins o	\$0	
	Subtotal			\$255, Pr	0	vider W	ins –	\$310,000	+22%
Н	ospital Pmt				F	Payer W	ins\		
	1 st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000	Ī	\$3,500	[\$350,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	70	\$245,000		\$3,500	40	\$140,900	-43%
T	otal Spending		100	\$850,000			100	\$800,000	-6%



Challenges With the FFS+P4P Model



Challenges With the FFS+P4P Model

- The amount of additional upfront payment needs to be determined in advance and it may or may not be adequate
- Stratifying the population based on risk requires stratifying the payment amounts, which adds complexity to coding and billing and increases the likelihood of mismatches between payment amounts and resources needed
- The target performance rates need to be established before it is clear what can be accomplished
- Random variation in patient characteristics can cause windfall bonuses and penalties and lack of predictability for both payers and providers
- The complexity and problematic incentives of FFS continue



Simply Paying More for "Postpartum Care" is Problematic

- There is little or no evidence that postpartum care services for all patients is cost-effective
- A payment that is too small or that is ineffectively targeted could fail to achieve the desired results, could increase net spending, and could cause failure of the overall initiative
- The goal should be achieving outcomes, not (simply) paying for specific services
- The strategy should be to target the right kinds of resources on the patients who will benefit from them



A Better Way: Condition-Based Payment

		CI	JRRE	NT
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$
Р	hysician Svcs			
	1 st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	30	\$45,000
	Subtotal			\$195,000
Н	ospital Pmt			
	1 st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000
T	otal Spending	\$6,500	100	\$650,000

100 Pregnant Women on Medicaid

- Physician delivers babies in the hospital
- Postpartum care included in physician's global fee; no separate or additional payment made
- 30% of women have a subsequent unplanned pregnancy



Start With What's Being Spent Today...

		CI	JRRE	NT
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$
Р	hysician Svcs			
	1 st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	30	\$45,000
	Subtotal			\$195,000
Н	ospital Pmt			
	1 st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000
To	otal Spending	\$6,500	100	\$650,000

Flexibility to Spend \$ Differently

		Cl	CURRENT				FUTUF	RE		
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	Chg	
P	hysician Svcs									
	1 st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000						
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0						
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	30	\$45,000						
	Margin									
	Subtotal			\$195,000						
Н	ospital Pmt									
	1 st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000						
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000						
To	otal Spending	\$6,500	100	\$650,000		\$6,400	100	\$640,000	-29	%



Use the Payment as a Budget to Allocate Among Providers

		CI	JRRE	NT		FUTUF	RE	
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	Chg
P	hysician Svcs							
	1 st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000				
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0				
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	30	\$45,000				
	Margin							
	Subtotal			\$195,000			\$209,500	+7%
Н	ospital Pmt							
	1 st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000		100	\$350,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000		23	\$80,500	23%
T	otal Spending	\$6,500	100	\$650,000	\$6,400	100	\$640,000	-2%



Providers "Pay" Themselves in Whatever Way Makes Sense

		CI	JRRE	NT		FUTUF	RE	
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	Chg
P	hysician Svcs							
	1st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000	\$1,500	100	\$150,000	
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0	\$250	100	\$25,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	30	\$45,000	\$1,500	23	\$34,500	-23%
					K			
	Margin						\$0	
	Subtotal			\$195,000			\$209,500	+7%
Н	ospital Pmt							
	1 st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000		100	\$350,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000		23	\$80,500	23%
T	otal Spending	\$6,500	100	\$650,000	\$6,400	100	\$640,000	-2%



E.g. Provide Services Prior to Delivery as Well as After

		CI	JRRE	NT		FUTUF	RE	
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	Chg
P	hysician Svcs							
	1 st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000	\$1,500	100	\$150,000	
<	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0	\$150	100	\$15,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	30	\$45,000	\$1,500	23	\$34,500	-23%
	Prenatal				\$100	X \00	\$10,000	
	Margin						\$0	
	Subtotal			\$195,000			\$209,500	+7%
Н	ospital Pmt							
	1 st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000		100	\$350,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000		23	\$80,500	23%
T	otal Spending	\$6,500	100	\$650,000	\$6,400	100	\$640,000	-2%



Win-Win-Win for Patients, Provider, and Payer

		CI	JRRE	NT			FUTUF	RE		
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	С	hg
P	hysician Svcs									
	1 st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000		\$1,500	100	\$150,000		
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0		\$250	100	\$25,000		
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	30	\$45,000		\$1,500	23	\$35,506	<u> </u>	23%
	Margin				ر	atient W	ins/	\$0		
	Subtotal			\$195, Pr	'O	vider W	ins_	\$209,500		+7%
Н	ospital Pmt			_	F	Payer W	/ ins⊾			
	1 st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000	_		100	\$350,000		
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000			23	\$80,500	_	23%
T	otal Spending	\$6,500	100	\$650,000		\$6,400	100	\$640,000		-2%



Better Performance for Patients, Bigger Win for Provider

		Cl	JRRE	NT			FUTUF	RE	
		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$		\$/Service	#/Yr	Total \$	Chg
Р	hysician Svcs								
	1st Pregnancy	\$1,500	100	\$150,000		\$1,500	100	\$150,000	
	Postpartum	\$0	100	\$0		\$250	100	\$25,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$1,500	30	\$45,000		\$1,500	15	\$22,506	-50%
	Margin				ر	atient W	ins/	\$40,000	
	Subtotal			\$195, Pr	O	vider W	ins_	\$237,500	+22%
Н	ospital Pmt				I	Payer W	/ins		
	1 st Pregnancy	\$3,500	100	\$350,000			100	\$350,000	
	2 nd Pregnancy	\$3,500	30	\$105,000			15	\$52,500	-50%
T	otal Spending	\$6,500	100	\$650,000		\$6,400	100	\$640,000	-2%



Accountable Payment Models Provide Flexibility + Accountability


BUILDING BLOCKS	HOW IT WORKS
Bundled Payment	Single payment to 2+ providers who are now paid separately (e.g., hospital+physician)
Warrantied Payment	Higher payment for quality care, no extra payment for avoiding complications
Condition- Based Payment	Payment based on the patient's condition, rather than on the procedure used



Accountable Payment Models Allow Win-Win-Win Approaches


BUILDING BLOCKS	HOW IT WORKS	HOW PHYSICIANS AND HOSPITALS CAN BENEFIT	HOW PAYERS CAN BENEFIT
Bundled Payment	Single payment to 2+ providers who are now paid separately (e.g., hospital+physician)	Higher payment for physicians if they reduce costs paid by hospitals	Physician and hospital offer a lower total price to Medicaid or health plan than today
Warrantied Payment	Higher payment for quality care, no extra payment for avoiding complications	Higher payment for physicians and hospitals with low rates of complications	Medicaid or health plan no longer pays more for high rates of complications
Condition- Based Payment	Payment based on the patient's condition, rather than on the procedure used	No loss of payment for physicians and hospitals using fewer tests and procedures	Medicaid or health plan no longer pays more for unnecessary procedures

Many Opportunities for Savings With Appropriate Payment Reforms






Bundles to Encourage Physicians to Reduce Hospital Costs






Warranties to Support Reductions in Delivery-Related Complications




Condition-Based Payment to Encourage More Vaginal Deliveries






Condition-Based Payment Can Encourage Lower-Cost Settings






Risk-Adjusted Payment Can Help Reduce Inappropriate Care





Payment Can Also Move Upstream to Improve Outcomes







1. Defining the Change in Care Delivery

— How can care be redesigned to improve quality and reduce costs?




1. Defining the Change in Care Delivery

— How can care be redesigned to improve quality and reduce costs?

2. Analyzing Expected Costs and Savings


- What will there be less of, and how much does that save?
- What will there be more of, and how much does that cost?
- Will the savings offset the costs on average?

More Detail on How to Create a Business Case for Payment Reform



Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform

www.PaymentReform.org





A Critical Element is Shared, Trusted Data

- Providers need to know the current utilization and costs for their patients to know whether the condition-based or bundled/warrantied payment amount will cover the costs of delivering effective care to the patients
- Purchaser/Payer needs to know the current utilization and costs to know whether the condition-based or bundled/warrantied payment amount is a better deal than they have today
- Both sets of data have to match in order for providers and payers to agree on the new approach!



1. Defining the Change in Care Delivery

— How can care be redesigned to improve quality and reduce costs?

2. Analyzing Expected Costs and Savings

- What will there be less of, and how much does that save?
- What will there be more of, and how much does that cost?
- Will the savings offset the costs on average?

3. Designing a Payment Model That Supports Change

- Flexibility to change the way care is delivered
- Accountability for costs and quality/outcomes related to care
- Adequate payment to cover lowest-achievable costs
- Protection for the provider against unmanageable risk



The Four Key Elements of Successful Payment Reforms

- 1. Flexibility in Care Delivery. The payment system should give providers freedom to deliver care in ways that will achieve high quality in the most efficient way and to adjust care delivery to the unique needs of individual patients.
- 2. Appropriate Accountability for Spending. The payment system should assure purchasers and payers that spending will decrease (or grow more slowly). The payment system should hold providers accountable for utilization and spending they can control, but not for services or costs they cannot control or influence.
- 3. Appropriate Accountability for Quality. The payment system should assure patients and payers that the quality of care will remain the same or improve. The payment system should hold providers accountable for quality they can control, but not for aspects of quality or outcomes they cannot control or influence.
- **4. Adequacy of Payment**. The size of the payments should be adequate to cover the providers' costs of delivering high quality care for the types of patients they see and at the levels of cost or efficiency that are feasible for them to achieve.



Protections For Providers Against Taking Unmanageable Risk

- Risk Adjustment: The payment rates to the provider would be adjusted based on objective characteristics of the patient and treatment that would be expected to result in the need for more services or increase the risk of complications.
- Outlier Payment or Individual Stop Loss Insurance: The payment to the provider from the payer would be increased if spending on an individual patient exceeds a pre-defined threshold. An alternative would be for the provider to purchase individual stop loss insurance (sometimes referred to as reinsurance) and include the cost of the insurance in the payment bundle.
- Risk Corridors or Aggregate Stop Loss Insurance: The payment to the provider would be increased if spending on all patients exceeds a pre-defined percentage above the payments. An alternative would be for the provider to purchase aggregate stop loss insurance and include the cost of the insurance in the payment bundle.
- Adjustment for External Price Changes: The payment to the provider would be adjusted for changes in the prices of drugs or services from other providers that are beyond the control of the provider accepting the payment.
- Excluded Services: Services the provider does not deliver, or order, or otherwise have the ability to influence would not be included as part of accountability measures in the payment system.



Quality Measures Should Focus on Protecting Against *Underuse*

- Eliminate measures that impede or duplicate the incentives in the new payment system
 - Process measures that dictate specific approaches without strong evidence of necessity
 - Overused and expensive services
- Emphasize measures that protect against underuse
 - Preventive services with longer-term benefits
 - Expensive services with strong evidence of benefit and serious impacts from failure to use when appropriate
- Implement appropriate use criteria wherever possible
 - Help providers avoid unnecessary services
 - Ensure patients receive necessary services



1. Defining the Change in Care Delivery

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- Flexibility to change the way care is delivered
- Accountability for costs and quality/outcomes related to care
- Adequate payment to cover lowest-achievable costs
- Protection for the provider

4. Trust, Transparency, and Collaborative Problem-Solving

- Recognition that only win-win-win solutions are sustainable
- Willingness to share accurate information on costs in order to develop win-win-win approaches
- Commitment to revise payments as necessary when costs, utilization, etc. do not turn out as expected



The Result: Better Maternity Care

Better Care for Patients

 Providers having the flexibility to design care that matches patient needs

Lower Spending for Payers


 Providers able to use the best combination of services for patients without worrying about which service generates more profits

Financially Viable Healthcare Providers


 Physicians, hospitals, hospice agencies, and other providers paid adequately to deliver high-quality care





Learn More About Win-Win-Win Payment and Delivery Reform











Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform

www.PaymentReform.org



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www.CHQPR.org www.PaymentReform.org